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THE YATES MEMO: DOJ PUBLIC 
RELATIONS MOVE OR MEANINGFUL 
REFORM THAT WILL END IMPUNITY FOR 
CORPORATE CRIMINALS? 
Abstract: On September 9, 2015, former Deputy Attorney General Sally 
Yates issued a memorandum (the “Yates Memo”) in an attempt to address the 
Department of Justice’s (“DOJ”) seeming inability to prosecute the individu-
als responsible for corporate crime and misconduct. The memo announced 
new DOJ policy regarding individual accountability for corporate fraud, 
wrongdoing, and other misconduct. Specifically, it identified six key policies 
meant to enable DOJ prosecutors to more effectively prosecute the individuals 
responsible for corporate misconduct. The memo, however, did not address 
the biggest obstacle to holding individuals accountable for criminal corporate 
conduct—the DOJ’s overuse of deferred prosecution and non-prosecution 
agreements. This Note argues that, because the Yates Memo did not specifical-
ly curtail the overuse of deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agree-
ments, it will not be able to achieve its stated goal of reducing impunity for 
the individuals responsible for corporate crime. This Note then provides poli-
cy suggestions for how the DOJ could further amend its policies to address 
the overuse of deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2008, systemic corporate wrongdoing led to a global economic reces-
sion.1 Despite industry-wide transgressions and excessive risk taking in the 
financial sector, only one executive was sent to prison.2 Kareem Serageldin, a 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See generally MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT: INSIDE THE DOOMSDAY MACHINE (2010) 
(discussing the consequences of the 2008 global financial crisis as well as the details of the Wall 
Street financial maneuvering that caused the crisis); ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: 
THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW WALL STREET AND WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL 
SYSTEM—AND THEMSELVES (2009) (same); Jesse Eisinger, Why Only One Top Banker Went to 
Jail for the Financial Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 30, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/04/
magazine/only-one-top-banker-jail-financial-crisis.html?_r=1 [https://perma.cc/HL6V-G72S] (same); 
Jed S. Rakoff, Why Have No High Level Executives Been Prosecuted in Connection with the Fi-
nancial Crisis?, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Nov. 15, 2013), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2013/
11/15/why-have-no-high-level-executives-been-prosecuted-in-connection-with-the-financial-crisis/ 
[https://perma.cc/TZ2Y-NJ79] (same). 
 2 See Amy J. Sepinwall, Responsible Shares and Shared Responsibility: In Defense of Re-
sponsible Corporate Officer Liability, 2014 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 371, 374 (discussing the lack of 
accountability for those responsible for the economic crisis); Eisinger, supra note 1 (reporting on 
the sole executive who was imprisoned following the financial crisis); Jesse Eisinger, Why the 
SEC Won’t Hunt Big Dogs, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 26, 2011), http://www.propublica.org/thetrade/
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trader at Credit Suisse, was sentenced to thirty months for concealing millions 
of dollars of losses in the bank’s mortgage-backed securities portfolio.3 As 
the judge stated as he handed down the verdict, Serageldin’s crime was but “a 
small piece of an overall evil climate within [Credit Suisse] and with many 
other banks.”4 
The failure of the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) to prosecute the in-
dividuals responsible for the crimes that led to the financial collapse is not 
simply a well-publicized anomaly.5 Rather, it is part of a trend of declining fed-
eral prosecutions of white-collar crime that started at least as early as 2008.6 
Indeed, according to the DOJ’s latest figures, federal prosecutors brought fewer 
white-collar cases in 2016 than in any of the last twenty-one years.7  
                                                                                                                           
item/why-the-sec-wont-hunt-big-dogs [https://perma.cc/CTG2-CZFE] (pointing out that no major 
banker was charged criminally as a result of the financial crisis); Neil Irwin, This Is a Complete 
List of Wall Street CEOs Prosecuted for Their Role in the Financial Crisis, WASH. POST: 
WONKBLOG (Sept. 12, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/09/12/
this-is-a-complete-list-of-wall-street-ceos-prosecuted-for-their-role-in-the-financial-crisis/ [https://
perma.cc/B9GS-QTKM] (highlighting the fact that not one person who led one of the corporations 
directly responsible for the financial crisis has seen any jail time); Jason Ryan, DOJ Will Not 
Prosecute Goldman Sachs in Financial Crisis Probe, ABC NEWS (Aug. 9, 2012), http://abcnews.
go.com/blogs/politics/2012/08/doj-will-not-prosecute-goldman-sachs-in-financial-crisis-probe/ 
[https://perma.cc/DHC8-T9NF] (noting that despite a number of high profile investigations into 
corporate wrongdoing, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) declined to fully prosecute any respon-
sible parties); Sarah White, RPT-In Post-Lehman Clean-Up, Top Banker Prosecutions Stumble, 
REUTERS (Sept. 14, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/14/lehman-fiveyear-crime-
idUSL5N0H929A20130914 [https://perma.cc/NED7-24AF] (explaining that, in the United States, 
no high level financial executives were criminally convicted in connection with the 2008 financial 
crisis). 
 3 Eisinger, supra note 1. Credit Suisse is a financial service provider headquartered in Swit-
zerland with a focus on private banking, wealth management, and investment banking. About Us, 
Our Company, CREDIT SUISSE, https://www.credit-suisse.com/us/en/about-us/our-company.html 
[https://perma.cc/2BJY-6H36]. 
 4 Eisinger, supra note 1. The overall “evil climate” that consumed so many Wall Street banks 
and financial institutions need not be documented at length here. See, e.g., Irwin, supra note 2 
(explaining the extensive negative impact of the financial crisis, as well as pointing out the lack of 
accountability for any of the people who caused it). There has been no shortage of reporting and 
analysis on the widespread misconduct committed by financial corporations such as Lehman 
Brothers, American International Group, Citigroup, and Merrill Lynch, among others. See, e.g., 
LEWIS, supra note 1 (providing a detailed analysis of the Wall Street financial manipulation that 
caused the crisis); SORKIN, supra note 1 (same); Eisinger, supra note 1 (same). 
 5 See Eisinger, supra note 1 (tracing the recent decline in the prosecution of white collar 
crime in the United States); Alan Pyke, Why the U.S. Isn’t Prosecuting White Collar Criminals, 
THINKPROGRESS (Aug. 4, 2015), http://thinkprogress.org/economy/2015/08/04/3687846/white-
collar-crime-prosecution-failure/ [https://perma.cc/BE67-L8XZ] (same). 
 6 See Eisinger, supra note 1 (discussing the gradual fall of white collar prosecution rates in 
the United States); Pyke, supra note 5 (same). 
 7 See White Collar Crime Prosecutions for December 2016, SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY’S TRANS-
ACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (Jan. 20, 2017) http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/
bulletins/white_collar_crime/monthlydec16/fil/ [https://perma.cc/39UD-75SQ] (explaining that 
DOJ white collar prosecutions in 2016 decreased by 23.9% from 2015); Federal White Collar 
Crime Prosecutions at 20-Year Low, SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY’S TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS AC-
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Moreover, there are no signs that this trend of declining white-collar 
prosecutions will abate soon.8 On March 11, 2017, the DOJ fired Preet Bha-
rara, U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York after he refused to 
resign his post.9 Although Bharara was criticized for his failure to prosecute 
any Wall Street executives for their role in the financial crisis, he was also 
known for his successful prosecutions of insider trading cases.10 The South-
ern District of New York is the epicenter for white-collar prosecutorial efforts 
in the United States.11 Bharara’s firing thus raises questions about whether 
white-collar prosecutions will further diminish during the Trump presiden-
cy.12 
This decline in prosecution of white-collar crime is doing more than 
simply angering ordinary Americans who feel as though the system is fixed in 
favor of the wealthy and powerful.13 It is also worrying legal analysts who 
                                                                                                                           
CESS CLEARINGHOUSE (July 29, 2015) http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/crim/398/ [https://perma.cc/
2NK9-A39T] (explaining that DOJ white-collar prosecutions in 2015 were at their lowest point in 
twenty years); see also White Collar Crime Convictions Continue to Decline, SYRACUSE UNIVER-
SITY’S TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (Apr. 7, 2016) http://trac.syr.edu/
whatsnew/email.160407.html [https://perma.cc/Z4UA-3BQ9] (providing statistical analysis of the 
decades long decline in DOJ white collar prosecutions); Pyke, supra note 5 (providing a general 
overview of the decline in white collar prosecution in the United States). Further, the U.S. gov-
ernment prosecuted 36.8 percent fewer white-collar crimes in 2015 than it did in 1995. Federal 
White Collar Crime Prosecutions at 20-Year Low, supra; Pyke, supra note 5. 
 8 See Press Release, Preet Bharara, U.S. Attorney, Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Attorney’s Office, S. 
Dist. of N.Y. (Mar. 11, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/statement-us-attorney-preet-
bharara-0 [https://perma.cc/264L-E7ST] (announcing that Preet Bharara was fired from his posi-
tion as U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York); Sheelah Kolhatkar, Preet Bharara’s 
Complicated Legacy on White-Collar Crime, NEW YORKER (Mar. 13, 2017), http://www.new
yorker.com/business/currency/preet-bhararas-complicated-legacy-on-white-collar-crime [https://
perma.cc/4LQW-X6KA] (questioning whether Bharara’s firing will hurt white collar prosecution 
efforts). 
 9 Press Release, Preet Bharara, supra note 8. 
 10 See, e.g., Peter Lattman & Azam Ahmed, Hedge Fund Billionaire Is Guilty of Insider Trad-
ing, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (May 11, 2011), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/05/11/rajaratnam-
found-guilty/ [https://perma.cc/9VJ2-QDWX] (detailing one of Bharara’s well known insider 
trading prosecutions); Jeffrey Toobin, The Showman: How U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara Struck 
Fear into Wall Street and Albany, NEW YORKER (May 9, 2016), http://www.newyorker.com/
magazine/2016/05/09/the-man-who-terrifies-wall-street [https://perma.cc/G5XS-A8GD] (discuss-
ing critiques of Bharara's handling of the financial crisis as well as his successes with other white 
collar prosecutions). 
 11 U.S. ATT’Y’S OFF., SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF N.Y., DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.
gov/usao-sdny [https://perma.cc/QYB2-KN4A]. 
 12 Kolhatkar, supra note 8 (discussing Bharara’s prosecutorial successes and asking whether 
white collar prosecutions “will continue with the same vigor” now that Bharara has been fired). 
 13 See Sharon E. Foster, Too Big to Prosecute: Collateral Consequences, Systemic Institutions 
and the Rule of Law, 34 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 655, 701–12 (2015) (discussing the negative 
societal consequences of the failure to prosecute high profile white collar crime); David M. 
Uhlmann, Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution Agreements and the Erosion of Corporate 
Criminal Liability, 72 MD. L. REV. 1295, 1298–99 (2013) (“There is no better deterrent to corpo-
rate crime than the realization that criminal activity could result in incarceration.”); Press Release, 
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believe that the lack of individual prosecution of corporate crime will encour-
age future abuses.14 Indeed, for most of American financial history, wide-
scale financial criminal scandals immediately preceded prosecutorial crack-
downs.15 After the financial collapse of 1929, the head of the New York Stock 
Exchange was tried, convicted, and sent to prison.16 The savings-and-loan 
crisis of the 1980s was followed by over 1,000 felony convictions, including 
jail time for many top executives at the largest failed banks.17 In the 1990s 
and early 2000s, after the Nasdaq bubble burst and systemic corporate ac-
counting misconduct was brought to light, high-ranking officials from corpo-
rations such as WorldCom, Enron, Qwest, and Tyco went to prison.18 But 
there was no prosecutorial crackdown after the 2008 financial crisis.19 
The theories for this discrepancy are broad and varied.20 Some believe 
that federal authorities were simply afraid to go after Wall Street bankers due 
to the risk of losing high profile, public cases.21 Others posit that federal 
prosecutors lack the resources to compete with the deep coffers of large cor-
                                                                                                                           
Senator Sherrod Brown, Sens. Brown, Grassley Press Justice Department on “Too Big to Jail” 
(Jan. 29, 2013), https://www.brown.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/sens-brown-grassley-press-
justice-department-on-too-big-to-jail [https://perma.cc/C7QK-R5DN] (“The nature of these set-
tlements has fostered concerns that ‘too big to fail’ Wall Street banks enjoy a favored status, in 
statute and in enforcement policy. This perception undermines the public’s confidence in our insti-
tutions and in the principal that the law is applied equally in all cases.”). 
 14 See Foster, supra note 13, at 700–01 (stating that a failure to prosecute white-collar crime 
undermines the public’s trust in the legal system); Uhlmann, supra note 13, at 1298–99 (explain-
ing that the possibility of jail time serves as the best deterrent to future corporate crime); Letter 
from Sen. Charles Grassley to Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen. (Dec. 13, 2012) (“[F]ail[ure] to 
prosecute individuals or banks when they have committed crimes will result in perverse incentives 
and ultimately undermine the integrity of the U.S. financial system and economy.”). 
 15 See Eisinger, supra note 1 (discussing the prosecutorial response to the savings-and-loan 
crisis in the 1980s); Rakoff, supra note 1 (noting that the 2008 financial crisis was not followed by 
the type of prosecutorial response that followed prior financial scandals in U.S. history). 
 16 Eisinger, supra note 1. 
 17 Pyke, supra note 5; Rakoff, supra note 1; see Harris Weinstein, Attorney Liability in the 
Savings and Loan Crisis, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 53, 53 (stating that in the four years prior to the 
article there were “over 1000 criminal cases and nearly 2000 civil cases arising from the savings 
and loan crisis,” which “include[d] more than ninety civil cases brought against lawyers”). 
 18 Eisinger, supra note 1; Rakoff, supra note 1. 
 19 Sepinwall, supra note 2, at 374; Eisinger, supra note 1; Rakoff, supra note 1. 
 20 See, e.g., Uhlmann, supra note 13, at 1320 (providing multiple explanations for this prose-
cutorial failure); Eisinger, supra note 1 (same). 
 21 See, e.g., Eisinger, supra note 1 (explaining that the DOJ did not aggressively pursue Wall 
Street executives who caused the crisis because it had a “careerist culture that was fearful of sully-
ing its reputation by losing cases”); Chris Matthews, Justice Department Is Setting Its Sights on 
White-Collar Criminals, FORTUNE (Sept. 10, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/09/10/wall-street-
crime/ [https://perma.cc/K49P-8MGB] (explaining that the lack of prosecutions was a result of “a 
cultural shift at Justice in the 1980s and 1990s which left the DOJ preferring to go after corpora-
tions because they were bigger prizes than lone executives, and because some kind of victory, 
usually in the form of a settlement or deferred prosecution agreement, was easier to achieve”).  
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porations able to spend millions of dollars on high powered defense firms.22 
Many argue that after several high profile white-collar prosecutorial losses in 
the 2000s, the DOJ began to focus on settlements instead of trials and prison 
sentences, thereby depriving its prosecutors of the experience needed to win 
in complicated corporate crime cases.23 Finally, some others explain the lack 
of prosecution as a result of the revolving door between DOJ leadership and 
white-collar defense firms.24 Whatever the case, the fact remains that current-
ly, the DOJ is remarkably ineffective at holding individuals accountable for 
corporate crimes.25 
On September 9, 2015, former Deputy Attorney General Sally Yates is-
sued a memorandum (the “Yates Memo”) in an attempt to address the DOJ’s 
inability and unwillingness to prosecute the individuals responsible for corpo-
rate crime and misconduct.26 This memo announced new DOJ policy regard-
                                                                                                                           
 22 See, e.g., Editorial Board, The Case of the Missing White-Collar Criminal, BLOOMBERG 
VIEW (June 22, 2014), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2014-06-22/the-case-of-the-
missing-white-collar-criminal [https://perma.cc/9QP4-B7F6] (“Large corporations have demon-
strated a willingness to pay eye-popping sums, at shareholders’ expense, to avoid the uncertainty 
and embarrassment of extended trials. Prosecutors with limited resources, no matter how dedicat-
ed to justice they may be, can't ignore the attractions of such negotiated settlements.”); David Cay 
Johnston, Opinion, New DOJ White-Collar Crime Policy Just Reheated Cabbage, AL JAZEERA 
AM. (Sept. 15, 2015), http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2015/9/new-doj-white-collar-crime-
policy-just-reheated-cabbage.html [https://perma.cc/XR6W-57HE] (stating that it is well known in 
large corporations that the DOJ does not have the resources to successfully prosecute complicated 
corporate criminal activity). 
 23 E.g., Eisinger, supra note 1; see Sheelah Kolhatkar, Has It Become Impossible to Prosecute 
White-Collar Crime?, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 21, 2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2015-10-21/has-it-become-impossible-to-prosecute-white-collar-crime- [https://perma.cc/GB4P-
NW8J] (“[L]aw enforcement may . . . lack[] the expertise to try [white-collar cases] in a court-
room in a way that makes sense to jurors . . . .”).  
 24 See, e.g., Scot J. Paltrow, Insight: Top Justice Officials Connected to Mortgage Banks, 
REUTERS (Jan. 20, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-holder-mortgage-idUSTRE80J
0PH20120120 [https://perma.cc/M7LT-H6MJ] (describing the deep connections between top DOJ 
officials and the law firms that represent mortgage banks involved in the 2008 housing crisis); Ben 
Protess, Once More Through the Revolving Door for Justice’s Breuer, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK 
(Mar. 28, 2013), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/03/28/once-more-through-the-revolving-
door-for-justices-breuer/ [https://perma.cc/M7BS-HQVY] (questioning the efficacy of a federal 
system of prosecution that relies on “Washington’s revolving door, the symbolic portal connecting 
government service” and high powered private law firms, as a supply line for new prosecutors). 
See generally GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY INST., Justice Inaction: The Department of Justice’s Un-
precedented Failure to Prosecute Big Finance (2012) (explaining the deep ties between the DOJ 
and the law firms that represent the corporations that the DOJ is charged with investigating). 
 25 See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY INST., supra note 24, at 4–7; Eisinger, supra note 1 (discuss-
ing the DOJ’s declining effectiveness in prosecuting white-collar crime). 
 26 Memorandum from Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy Att’y Gen., to All Component Heads and 
United States Attorneys, Individual Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing, at 1 (Sept. 9, 2015) 
[hereinafter Yates Memo]; see Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy Att’y Gen., Remarks at New York 
University School of Law Announcing New Policy on Individual Liability in Matters of Corporate 
Wrongdoing (Sept. 10, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-sally-
quillian-yates-delivers-remarks-new-york-university-school [https://perma.cc/8GKE-VCUZ] (articu-
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ing individual accountability for corporate fraud, wrongdoing, and other mis-
conduct.27 Specifically, the memo identified six key policies meant to enable 
DOJ attorneys to more effectively prosecute individuals responsible for cor-
porate misconduct.28 
This Note explores the effect that these new policies will likely have on 
DOJ prosecution of individual white collar criminals, and argues that the 
Yates Memo must be supplemented with measures explicitly limiting DOJ 
prosecutors’ ability to decline prosecution of the individuals responsible for 
corporate crime.29 Part I of this Note discusses the history of corporate crimi-
nal liability in the United States and traces the development of the DOJ’s tac-
tics for prosecuting corporate crime.30 Part II introduces the Yates Memo 
guidelines for effective prosecution of corporate criminals, and then details its 
shortcomings.31 Finally, Part III argues that the Yates Memo policies will not 
do enough to further corporate crime prosecution, and provides suggestions 
for how the DOJ can further amend its policies to truly succeed in prosecut-
ing corporate crime and misconduct.32 
I. THE DOJ’S PROSECUTORIAL STRATEGY FOR CORPORATE CRIME:  
A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 
Corporate criminal liability was first introduced in 1909 in the U.S. Su-
preme Court case of New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Co. v. Unit-
ed States, and is now well established in federal case law.33 Despite this early 
                                                                                                                           
lating rationale underlying Yates Memo). On January 30, 2017, President Donald Trump fired 
Sally Yates after she refused to cooperate in the defense of one of President Trump’s executive 
orders that, among other things, halted nationals from seven predominantly Muslim countries from 
entering the United States. Michael D. Shear et al., Trump Fires Acting Attorney General Who 
Defied Him, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/30/us/politics/trump-
immigration-ban-memo.html [https://perma.cc/YE4J-MBJY]. 
 27 Yates Memo, supra note 26, at 2. 
 28 Id. at 2–3. 
 29 See infra notes 164–203 and accompanying text. 
 30 See infra notes 33–120 and accompanying text. 
 31 See infra notes 121–163 and accompanying text. 
 32 See infra notes 164–203 and accompanying text. 
 33 See 212 U.S. 481, 494 (1909) (holding that corporations are criminally liable for any act 
committed by an employee if the act was committed within the scope of the employment, and was 
committed for the benefit of the corporation); see also United States v. Bank of New Eng., 821 
F.2d 844, 856 (1st Cir. 1987) (upholding the “collective knowledge” doctrine, which attributes the 
knowledge of all a corporation’s employees and agents to the corporation as an entity, in the realm 
of corporate criminal liability); United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1004 (9th 
Cir. 1972) (noting that the criminal liability of an employer for the acts of its employees within the 
scope of their employment can be either express or implied); Sarah Helene Duggin, Internal Cor-
porate Investigations: Legal Ethics, Professionalism and the Employee Interview, 2003 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 859, 868–70 (explaining that corporate criminal prosecutions are now common-
place). In order to impose liability, the corporation must act with the mental state required by the 
statute at issue, which usually involves imputing the mental state of individual employees or 
2017] The Yates Memo and the DOJ’s Failure to Prosecute Corporate Crime 749 
development of corporate criminal liability legal theory, the DOJ did not pro-
vide any specific guidance regarding prosecutions of corporate crime until the 
mid-1990s.34 Section A of this Part describes these original DOJ guidelines 
for corporate criminal prosecutions, which were established by then-Deputy 
Attorney General Eric Holder.35 Section B details the transformation of these 
guidelines as a result of certain prosecutorial failures.36 Finally, Section C 
examines the problems and consequences of the DOJ’s pre-Yates Memo cor-
porate crime prosecution strategies.37 
A. The Holder Memo: The First Comprehensive DOJ Guidelines  
Governing Prosecution of Corporate Crime 
During the 1990s, in recognition that federal prosecutors were increas-
ingly confronting crimes committed by corporations as a whole, then-Deputy 
Attorney General Eric Holder created a working group directed by the Fraud 
Section of the Criminal Division with the intention of developing uniform 
DOJ policy regarding prosecution of corporate crime.38 In June 1999, Holder 
issued a policy memorandum titled “Federal Prosecution of Corporations,” 
generally referred to as the “Holder Memo,” that provided the first compre-
hensive guidelines for federal prosecution of corporate crime.39 The memo 
                                                                                                                           
agents to the corporation. See Steere Tank Lines, Inc. v. United States, 330 F.2d 719, 722 (5th Cir. 
1963) (“[K]nowledge of employees and agents of the corporation is attributable to the corporation, 
and that their acts may amount to wilfulness on the part of the corporation.”). If no individual 
employee has the requisite mental state, corporate liability can still be imposed if the corporate 
employees possess the mental state collectively. Bank of New Eng., 821 F.2d at 855–56. Addition-
ally, corporations cannot assert as a defense that the officers did not authorize the criminal conduct 
or that the corporation’s official policies prohibited the criminal conduct. Hilton Hotels, 467 F.2d 
at 1004, 1007. 
 34 Uhlmann, supra note 13, at 1309. 
 35 See infra notes 38–49 and accompanying text. 
 36 See infra notes 50–72 and accompanying text. 
 37 See infra notes 73–120 and accompanying text. 
 38 Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Deputy Att’y Gen., to All Component Heads and 
U.S. Attorneys, at 1 (June 16, 1999) [hereinafter Holder Memo] (stating that the memo is meant to 
provide “guidance as to what factors should generally inform a prosecutor in making the decision 
whether to charge a corporation in a particular case” because “[m]ore and more often, federal 
prosecutors are faced with criminal conduct committed by or on behalf of corporations”). This 
group included representatives from the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices, the Executive Office of U.S. 
Attorneys, and the litigating divisions of the departments with criminal responsibilities. Id. 
 39 See Holder Memo, supra note 38 (listing out the comprehensive guidelines); see also 
Christopher A. Wray & Robert K. Hur, Corporate Criminal Prosecution in a Post-Enron World: 
The Thompson Memo in Theory and Practice, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1095, 1099 (2006) (explain-
ing that until the issuance of the Holder Memo, the “Justice Department had no uniform policy on 
corporate prosecution”). Since 1980, the Principles of Federal Prosecution (the “Principles”), a 
DOJ manual that provides guidelines for all types of federal prosecutions, has also guided federal 
prosecutors. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION (1997), reprinted in 
U.S. ATTORNEY’S MANUAL, tit. 9, ch. 27 (U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 2017). In determining whether 
to bring criminal charges, prosecutors are instructed by the Principles to consider, inter alia: 
750 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 58:743 
identified eight factors for prosecutors to consider when making a determina-
tion of whether to charge a corporate entity or its employees.40 In addition, 
the memo contained extensive language extolling the virtues of corporate 
criminal prosecutions, stating that these prosecutions allow the government to 
bring about beneficial changes to corporate culture and deter future corporate 
criminal activity.41 
After the issuance of the Holder Memo, federal prosecutions of white-
collar crime became consistent and effective for the next three years.42 The 
Justice Department brought more than 100 corporate criminal case in 2000, 
                                                                                                                           
Federal law enforcement priorities . . . ; the nature and seriousness of the offense; 
the deterrent effect of prosecution; the person’s culpability in connection with the 
offense; the person’s history with respect to criminal activity; the person’s willing-
ness to cooperate in the investigation or prosecution of others . . . ; the probable sen-
tence or other consequences if the person is convicted . . . ; an adequate non-
criminal alternative to prosecution . . . ; the sanctions or other measures available 
under the alternative means of disposition; the likelihood that an effective sanction 
will be imposed; and the effect of non-criminal disposition on federal law enforce-
ment interests. 
U.S. ATTORNEY’S MANUAL § 9-27.200, .230, .250. The Principles also list factors to be consid-
ered when deciding whether to enter into plea agreements or non-prosecution agreements in return 
for cooperation. See id. § 9-27.420, .620. 
 40 See Holder Memo, supra note 38, at 3. The eight factors were: 
(1) [t]he nature and seriousness of the offense, including the risk of harm to the pub-
lic . . . ; (2) [t]he pervasiveness of wrongdoing within the corporation, including the 
complicity in, or condonation of, the wrongdoing by corporate management; (3) 
[t]he corporation’s history of similar conduct, including prior criminal, civil, and 
regulatory enforcement actions against it; (4) [t]he corporation’s timely and volun-
tary disclosure of wrongdoing and its willingness to cooperate in the investigation of 
its agents including, if necessary, the waiver of the corporate attorney-client and 
work product privileges; (5) [t]he existence and adequacy of the company’s compli-
ance program; (6) [t]he corporation’s remedial actions, including any efforts to im-
plement an effective corporate compliance program or to improve an existing one, to 
replace responsible management, to discipline or terminate wrongdoers, to pay resti-
tution, and to cooperate with the relevant government agencies; (7) [c]ollateral con-
sequences, including disproportionate harm to shareholders and employees not 
proven personally culpable; and (8) [t]he adequacy of non-criminal remedies, such 
as civil or regulatory enforcement actions. 
Id. 
 41 See id. at 1–2 (declaring that corporate criminal prosecutions allow the government to “be a 
force for positive change of corporate culture, alter corporate behavior, and prevent, discover, and 
punish white collar crime”). 
 42 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2001 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 
tbl. 51 (2001) (reporting 238 prosecutions of organizations resulting in fines or restitution or both 
in fiscal year 2001); U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2000 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING 
STATISTICS tbl. 51 (2000) (reporting 296 prosecutions of organizations resulting in fines or restitu-
tion or both in fiscal year 2000); U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 1999 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL 
SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl. 51 (1999) (reporting 255 prosecutions of organizations resulting in 
fines or restitution or both in fiscal year 1999). 
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and was especially effective in its prosecution of regulatory crime.43 Im-
portantly, the DOJ rarely utilized deferred prosecution agreements (“DPAs”), 
non-prosecution agreements (“NPAs”), or other alternatives to criminal pros-
ecution.44 
The DOJ’s approach to corporate criminal prosecution changed dramati-
cally after the disastrous prosecution of Arthur Andersen LLP, one of the “big 
five” accounting firms, in 2002.45 The DOJ decided to indict the firm after the 
collapse of the Enron corporation, when evidence of a massive accounting 
fraud by Arthur Anderson came to light.46 After the indictment, the public 
quickly lost faith in the firm, it began to rapidly lose clients, and it eventually 
collapsed under the pressure.47 Although the DOJ justified its indictment with 
evidence of Arthur Andersen’s widespread, damaging accounting fraud and 
destruction of evidence during the pending criminal trial, observers heavily 
criticized the DOJ for prosecuting the firm and thereby dealing it a death-
blow.48 Critics were especially concerned with the fact that when Arthur An-
                                                                                                                           
 43 Uhlmann, supra note 13, at 1308; see U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2000 SOURCEBOOK, 
supra note 42 (reporting 296 prosecutions of organizations resulting in fines or restitution or both 
in fiscal year 2000). 
 44 Uhlmann, supra note 13, at 1308 Deferred prosecution agreements (“DPAs”) normally 
allow DOJ prosecutors to file criminal charges against a defendant, but these charges are stayed or 
dismissed after a certain length of time if the company meets certain requirements laid out in the 
agreement. Wray & Hur, supra note 39, at 1104. In contrast, with non-prosecution agreements 
(“NPAs”), the DOJ does not file any charges at all, and individuals are allowed to completely 
avoid prosecution in exchange for cooperation as required in the agreement. Id. at 1105. In the 
nine years preceding 2001, which includes both the years leading up to the Holder Memo and the 
immediate subsequent years, the DOJ only entered into thirteen DPAs. See Brandon L. Garrett & 
Jon Ashley, Federal Organizational Prosecution Agreements, UNIV. VA. SCH. LAW, http://lib.law.
virginia.edu/Garrett/prosecution_agreements/home.suphp [https://perma.cc/N679-C47V] (main-
taining an extensive, and regularly updated, list of Federal Organizational Prosecution Agree-
ments). 
 45 Uhlmann, supra note 13, at 1310–11. Arthur Andersen was a major U.S. accounting firm. 
Kurt Eichenwald, Enron’s Many Strands: The Investigation; Andersen Charged with Obstruction 
in Enron Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/03/15/business/
enron-s-many-strands-investigation-andersen-charged-with-obstruction-enron.html [https://perma.
cc/P3FU-5LL3]. 
 46 Eichenwald, supra note 45. Enron was a major U.S. corporation that focused its business 
on the energy industry. See generally BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST 
GUYS IN THE ROOM: THE AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON (2003); The Fall of 
Enron: Collapse Felt from Workers’ Homes to Halls of Government, NPR, http://www.npr.org/
news/specials/enron/ [https://perma.cc/A5A6-7KM2] (detailing the Enron corporation and its 
downfall). Enron’s collapse was precipitated by the discovery that it had concealed huge debts and 
profit losses in an effort to buoy its stock price. The Fall of Enron, supra. Arthur Andersen was 
Enron’s accounting firm. Eichenwald, supra note 45. It was convicted for its role in the account-
ing fraud that helped hide Enron’s debts and losses. Id. 
 47 Roquet v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 398 F.3d 585, 587–88 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 48 See Uhlmann, supra note 13, at 1310 (providing examples of this criticism); Carrie Johnson, 
Ruling Won’t Deter Prosecution of Fraud, WASH. POST (June 1, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.
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dersen went out of business, 28,000 mostly innocent employees lost their jobs 
and competition in the accounting industry further diminished.49 
B. The Thompson Memo: The DOJ Changes Course in an Effort  
to Focus on Cooperation Over Full Prosecution 
The criticism arising from the Arthur Andersen debacle led the DOJ to 
issue new guidance regarding the criminal prosecution of corporations.50 In 
January 2003, Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson issued a memoran-
dum, the new Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations, a 
document very similar in content to the Holder Memo, but with a new section 
devoted to cooperation.51 This section introduced the possibility of deferred 
prosecution for cooperative corporations and stated that cooperation and vol-
untary disclosure could warrant granting immunity, amnesty, or pretrial diver-
sion.52 
In 2008, the DOJ again revised its corporate criminal prosecution guide-
lines with the issuance of the Filip Memo.53 This memo fully endorsed DPAs 
and NPAs as central to DOJ prosecution strategy and also explicitly validated 
the analysis of the potential collateral consequences of full prosecution when 
considering alternatives.54 The guidance stated that possible collateral conse-
                                                                                                                           
com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/05/31/AR2005053101555.html [https://perma.cc/QG55-4KRW] 
(discussing the harsh collateral consequences of the indictment). 
 49 See Jonathan D. Glater, Last Task at Andersen: Turning Out the Lights, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 
2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/08/30/business/last-task-at-andersen-turning-out-the-lights.
html [https://perma.cc/X9U8-E5U9] (documenting the negative fallout from the Arthur Andersen 
prosecution). 
 50 See Lisa Kern Griffin, Compelled Cooperation and the New Corporate Criminal Proce-
dure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 311, 321–22 (2007) (explaining the reasoning behind the issuance of the 
new guidance). See generally Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Att’y Gen., to 
Heads of Department Components and United States Attorneys, Principles of Federal Prosecution 
of Business Organizations (Jan. 20, 2003) [hereinafter Thompson Memo] (listing out the new 
principles meant to guide criminal prosecutions of corporations). 
 51 Thompson Memo, supra note 50, at 1. 
 52 Id. at 6. This new policy guidance, however, further solidified the DOJ’s new focus on 
alternatives to prosecution, rather than signaling a totally new direction. See Uhlmann, supra note 
13, at 1311. According to federal prosecution statistics, the DOJ had already begun increasing its 
use of DPAs and NPAs prior to the issuance of the Thompson Memo. Garrett & Ashley, supra 
note 44. From 1992 through 2000, the DOJ only entered into thirteen DPAs and NPAs. Id. In 2001 
and 2002, prior to the Thompson Memo, the DOJ entered into eight DPAs and NPAs. Id. Then, in 
2003 and 2004, post-Thompson Memo, the DOJ greatly expanded the use of these agreements by 
utilizing them fifteen different times. Id. This increased use, however, did not signal a true over-
haul of the DOJ’s approach to prosecution. Uhlmann, supra note 13, at 1311. Rather, these agree-
ments were primarily used in the context of the department’s overall strategy to increase corporate 
cooperation. Id. at 1312. 
 53 Memorandum from Mark Filip, Deputy Att’y Gen., to Heads of Department Components 
and United States Attorneys, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (Aug. 
28, 2008). 
 54 Id. at 2, 7–8, 17–18. 
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quences to innocent third parties should influence the DOJ to offer NPAs de-
signed to incentivize compliance with relevant law and to prevent future 
criminal misconduct.55 This change in policy fully entrenched the DOJ’s use 
of alternatives to prosecution in their overall corporate crime fighting strate-
gy.56 
Although the DOJ’s Criminal Division continues to bring criminal pros-
ecutions against corporations and individuals for their participation in corpo-
rate crime, the overwhelming evidence points to the Criminal Division’s pref-
erence for DPAs and NPAs over full prosecution.57 From 2011 through 2013, 
more than two-thirds of the DOJ’s corporate criminal cases have ended in 
DPAs or NPAs instead of full prosecution.58 In addition, local U.S. Attorney’s 
Offices have adopted the extensive use of prosecutorial alternatives.59 Over 
the past seven or eight years, the U.S. Attorney’s Offices for the Southern 
District of New York, the District of Massachusetts, the District of New Jer-
sey, the Central District of California, and the Eastern District of New York 
have all begun to increasingly use alternatives to prosecution when investigat-
ing corporate crime.60 
                                                                                                                           
 55 Id. The language of the memo provides: 
[W]here the collateral consequences of a corporate conviction for innocent third par-
ties would be significant, it may be appropriate to consider a non-prosecution or de-
ferred prosecution agreement with conditions designed, among other things, to pro-
mote compliance with applicable law and to prevent recidivism . . . . Obtaining a 
conviction may produce a result that seriously harms innocent third parties who 
played no role in the criminal conduct. Under appropriate circumstances, a deferred 
prosecution or non-prosecution agreement can help restore the integrity of a compa-
ny’s operations and preserve the financial viability of a corporation that has engaged 
in criminal conduct . . . . 
Id. at 18. 
 56 Id. Indeed, from 2008 through 2012, the DOJ averaged more than thirty DPAs and NPAs in 
corporate crime cases every year, with peaks of thirty-eight in 2010 and thirty-seven in 2012. 
Garrett & Ashley, supra note 44. This shift was most pronounced in the DOJ’s Criminal Division, 
where agreements such as these became more frequent than actual criminal prosecutions. See id. 
(recording DPAs and NPAs entered into by the DOJ). From 2010 through 2012, the Criminal 
Division alone entered into forty-six DPAs and NPAs, a figure more than double the twenty-two 
plea agreements entered into during the same time frame. See id. (listing the DPAs, NPAs, and 
plea agreements entered into by the DOJ during that timeframe). 
 57 Uhlmann, supra note 13, at 1318. 
 58 Garrett & Ashley, supra note 44; see Uhlmann, supra note 13, at 1318 (discussing the rise 
in the use of DPAs and NPAs over this time period). 
 59 Garrett & Ashley, supra note 44. 
 60 Id. The various U.S. Attorneys offices are within the greater DOJ. Offices of the United 
States Attorneys: About, DOJ, https://www.justice.gov/usao/about-offices-united-states-attorneys 
[https://perma.cc/33JQ-VC6Q]. The offices mainly handle prosecution of federal criminal cases 
related to activities within their assigned judicial districts. Id. The DOJ’s more general Criminal 
Division, located in Washington, D.C., prosecutes nationally significant criminal cases and im-
plements criminal enforcement policy binding on all prosecutors working for the DOJ. About the 
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The DOJ justifies the use of these DPAs, NPAs, and other alternatives to 
prosecution by citing a desire to avoid unnecessary collateral consequences to 
innocent parties.61 Commentators, however, have proposed various alternate 
explanations for the DOJ’s recent reliance on alternatives to prosecution.62 
For instance, many have claimed that the DOJ’s goal was to obtain more priv-
ilege waivers through these agreements.63 They argue that corporate crime 
prosecutors strongly wish to ensure that corporations share information re-
garding possible conspirators or accomplices, information that often times is 
very difficult to access due to attorney-client privilege.64 Since waiving the 
attorney-client privilege is a fairly drastic step, prosecutors need strong lever-
age, such as NPAs, to ensure acquisition of the highly sought-after waivers.65 
                                                                                                                           
Criminal Division, DOJ, https://www.justice.gov/criminal/about-criminal-division [https://perma.
cc/75ZZ-6A44]. 
 61 U.S. ATTORNEY’S MANUAL, PRINCIPLE OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF BUSINESS ORGANI-
ZATIONS § 9-28.1100(B) (U.S. Dep’t of Justice 2017). As previously mentioned, the 2008 revision 
to the Principles of Federal Prosecution for Business Organizations, the most recent DOJ corpo-
rate prosecution guidance document, recommends these alternatives to prosecution in order to 
avoid collateral consequences. Id. Further, in a September 2012 speech meant to promote the use 
of DPAs and NPAs, the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division affirmed that these 
agreements are necessary in order to avoid undesirable collateral harm to employees and share-
holders. Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice Criminal Div., Address at 
the N.Y.C. Bar Association: The Role of Deferred Prosecution Agreements in White Collar Crim-
inal Law Enforcement (Sept. 13, 2012). 
 62 See, e.g., Sarah Helene Duggin, The McNulty Memorandum, the KPMG Decision and Cor-
porate Cooperation: Individual Rights and Legal Ethics, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 341, 351–54 
(2008) (suggesting that during the Bush era, the Thompson Memo and corporate crime prosecu-
tion reform were made in response to the “financial debacles” that followed the collapse of En-
ron); Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853, 855–56 (2007) 
(suggesting that prosecutors use NPAs and DPAs to enact structural reform within corporations); 
Uhlmann, supra note 13, at 1312–13 (discussing the different theories). 
 63 Uhlmann, supra note 13, at 1312–13; see also Griffin, supra note 50, at 323 (explaining 
that most current DPAs require privilege waivers). Attorney-client privilege normally prevents 
federal prosecutors from accessing communications between defense attorneys and their corporate 
clients. Alexander C. Black, Annotation, What Corporate Communications Are Entitled to Attor-
ney-Client Privilege—Modern Cases, 27 A.L.R.5th Art. 76 (1995). In cases of corporate crime, 
corporations often have their attorneys conduct internal investigations to assess whether their 
employees committed criminal acts. Id. Privilege normally covers such communications. Id. Be-
cause these protected internal communications can be very useful to federal prosecutors, commen-
tators argue that corporate crime prosecutors have strong incentive to request waivers of the privi-
lege. Uhlmann, supra note 13, at 1312–13. See generally Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, 
Deputy Att’y Gen., to Heads of Department Components and United States Attorneys, Principles 
of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations, 8–9 (Dec. 12, 2006) [hereinafter McNulty 
Memo] (discussing the benefits to federal prosecutors from obtainer of a waiver of the attorney-
client privilege during an investigation into corporate crime). 
 64 Uhlmann, supra note 13, at 1312–13; see also McNulty Memo, supra note 63, at 8–9 (dis-
cussing the difficulties in obtaining important information during corporate crime investigations 
due to the attorney-client privilege). 
 65 Uhlmann, supra note 13, at 1312–13; see also Wray & Hur, supra note 39, at 1104–05 
(explaining that the DOJ uses DPAs and NPAs to obtain cooperation from corporations); Thomp-
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More cynical commentators have argued that the pro-business Bush ad-
ministration wanted to promote a business friendly political climate by en-
couraging the use of DPAs and NPAs.66 The facts, however, do not support 
this political narrative.67 As previously stated, DPAs actually increased under 
the Obama administration.68 Under most evaluations, the Bush administration 
was much tougher on corporate crime than the Obama administration.69 
Finally, other legal analysts contend that the DOJ’s preference for prose-
cutorial alternatives is the result of a straightforward cost-benefit analysis; the 
Department can obtain strong financial sanctions, admissions of wrongdoing, 
corporate cooperation, and structural compliance programs through DPAs and 
NPAs, all without expending the resources necessary to fully complete a corpo-
rate prosecution.70 For prosecutors, there is simply not much of an advantage to 
full prosecution, which leads to collateral consequences, excess resource ex-
penditure, and ultimately, the risk of losing at trial.71 In contrast, through alter-
native prosecution agreements, prosecutors can efficiently achieve fairly attrac-
tive settlement terms without the risks that full trials pose.72 
C. Problems with Pre-Yates Memo DOJ Prosecution Policy 
Irrespective of the DOJ’s pre-Yates Memo justification for the over-
whelming use of DPAs and NPAs, this strategy has many negative conse-
quences.73 The five principle consequences are explained in detail below.74 
                                                                                                                           
son Memo, supra note 50, at 6 (instructing DOJ prosecutors to use NPAs, under certain circum-
stances, in exchange for cooperation from a corporation). 
 66 Uhlmann, supra note 13, at 1323. 
 67 See Duggin, supra note 62, at 351–54 (suggesting that during the Bush era, the Thompson 
Memo and corporate crime prosecution reform were made in response to the “financial debacles” 
that followed the collapse of Enron rather than as part of a political agenda). 
 68 Garrett & Ashley, supra note 44. 
 69 See Uhlmann, supra note 13, at 1323 (discussing the use of prosecution agreements during 
both the Bush administration and Obama administration); Eisinger, supra note 1 (comparing the 
Bush administration’s aggressive prosecution of corporate crime to the Obama administration’s 
failure to successfully prosecute such crime); Garrett & Ashley, supra note 44 (providing statisti-
cal analysis on the increase in DPAs and NPAs under the Obama administration). 
 70 Uhlmann, supra note 13, at 1324. 
 71 Id.; Christopher A. Wray, Assistant Att’y Gen., Criminal Div., Remarks to the Association 
of Certified Fraud Examiners, Mid-South Chapter, Memphis, Tenn. (Sept. 2, 2004). 
 72 Uhlmann, supra note 13, at 1324. 
 73 See Brandon L. Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, 97 VA. L. REV. 1775, 1810–
11 (2011) (noting that foreign firms are more likely to receive a high penalty and less likely to 
reach a DPA or NPA than domestic firms); Peter R. Reilly, Justice Deferred Is Justice Denied: We 
Must End Our Failed Experiment in Deferring Corporate Criminal Prosecutions, 2015 BYU L. 
REV. 307, 339–346 (explaining the many negative attributes of DPAs and NPAs); Uhlmann, supra 
note 13, at 1326–44 (same). 
 74 See Reilly, supra note 73, at 339–346 (discussing these negative consequences); Uhlmann, 
supra note 13, at 1326–44 (same); John C. Coffee, Jr., Deferred Prosecution: Has It Gone Too 
Far?, NAT’L L.J., July 25, 2005, at 13 (same). 
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First, the DOJ has a fundamental commitment to enforce the law in a 
fair and even-handed manner, but evidence shows that the DOJ pursues non-
criminal alternatives to prosecution more often with large, influential compa-
nies than it does with smaller, private corporations.75 Further, beyond a failure 
to affect impartial enforcement of the laws, this tendency has negative utilitar-
ian consequences.76 Favorable treatment of large corporations creates a lack 
of public trust in the legal system, which can have a negative economic im-
pact.77 Thus, commentators argue that, at the very least, enforcement should 
be equally focused on large and small corporations alike.78 
Second, the use of deferred and non-prosecution agreements require 
DOJ prosecutors to implement corporate structural reforms, but implementa-
tion of such reforms lies outside prosecutors’ realm of expertise and authori-
ty.79 Voluminous research exposes the fact that federal prosecutors are steadi-
ly abandoning their traditional role in prosecuting and punishing corporate 
criminal activity in favor of attempts to reform corporate structure through 
DPAs and NPAs.80 As many analysts have pointed out, prosecutors are 
                                                                                                                           
 75 Uhlmann, supra note 13, at 1326–27. Scholars have identified a number of troubling trends 
in the use of deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements. See Garrett, supra note 73, at 
1811 (analyzing impact of DPAs and NPAs on foreign and domestic firms). Deferred prosecution 
and non-prosecution occur most often during investigations of large, publicly owned corporations. 
Id. Smaller, privately held corporations more often face criminal prosecution. Id. 
 76 Foster, supra note 13, at 700–06. 
 77 See id. (discussing the negative consequences resulting from disparate treatment of large 
and small corporations). 
 78 Id. 
 79 Interview with Mary Jo White, Partner, Debevoise & Plimpton LLP, New York, New York, 
CORP. CRIME REPORTER, Dec. 12, 2005, at 48, http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/maryjo
whiteinterview010806.htm [https://perma.cc/PCJ8-3QZZ]. See generally Miriam Hechler Baer, 
Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REV. 949 (2009) (discussing prosecutors’ ineffec-
tiveness in attempting to enact corporate governance reforms). Mary Jo White, former U.S. Attor-
ney for the Southern District of New York and former Chair of the SEC, stated that “[f]or a prose-
cutor to get into the business of changing corporate culture is skating on fairly thin ice.” Id. Pro-
fessor John C. Coffee, Jr. similarly stated, “I don’t think prosecutors are particularly skilled in 




 80 See Peter Spivack & Sujit Raman, Regulating the ‘New Regulators’: Current Trends in 
Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 159, 161 (2008) (explaining that DOJ 
prosecutors, based on reliance on DPAs and NPAs, appear to believe that the primary role of cor-
porate criminal enforcement is to improve corporate cultural practices and institute systemic struc-
tural reform); see also Garrett, supra note 62, at 886–87 (arguing that the DOJ has purposefully 
adopted a reform-minded enforcement strategy in the aftermath of repeated corporate scandals, a 
strategy which is different from the normal role of prosecutors—to prioritize successful convic-
tions). These corporate reform DPAs often include provisions that require companies to (1) 
change employee payment structures, (2) modify contractual agreements with outside third par-
ties, (3) change the structure of their board of directors, (4) replace executives or other employees, 
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trained to be effective litigators and enforcers of the laws; they are not experts 
on structural corporate governance reformation.81 Therefore, it is unclear 
whether federal prosecutors have the necessary competence to implement 
effective deferred prosecution agreements, which require complicated struc-
tural reforms.82 
Additionally, it remains unclear whether federal prosecutors actually 
have the statutory authority to implement corporate reform through NPAs and 
DPAs.83 These agreements are only mentioned once in the United States fed-
eral code, in a section solely covering statute of limitations waivers.84 Further, 
even if they do have this authority, it appears that it is being exercised in con-
tradiction with the DOJ’s policies.85 Certain experts have posited that federal 
law does not authorize corporate reform and that federal prosecutors are im-
plementing corporate law policies that Congress has not approved.86 Even if 
prosecutors do have this authority, however, their seemingly indiscriminate 
                                                                                                                           
(5) establish new ethics programs, and (6) terminate certain business relationships. Reilly, supra 
note 73, at 343–44. 
 81 See Garrett, supra note 62, at 936 (observing that Federal prosecutors have abandoned their 
traditional role of obtaining convictions, and, in doing so, have attempted to reshape the govern-
ance structure of large corporate bodies); Paul E. McGreal, Corporate Compliance Survey, 64 
BUS. LAW. 253, 260–61 (2008) (discussing how DPAs force governance reforms upon corpora-
tions, including requiring complete reformations of boards of directors); P.J. Meitl, Who’s the 
Boss? Prosecutorial Involvement in Corporate America, 34 N. KY. L. REV. 1, 12–13 (2007) (de-
scribing how DPAs require changes at the core of corporate governance structures, changes nor-
mally made by board directors, with examples such as requiring a company to add an independent 
board member, to cease private client compensation and benefits practices, to change the man-
agement of the company, and to add new seats on the board); Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Cooperative 
Tax Regulation, 41 CONN. L. REV. 431, 475–76 (2008) (describing the DOJ’s DPA with the ac-
counting firm KPMG resulting from a multi-billion dollar criminal tax fraud investigation, as one 
which required the firm to cease certain tax consulting practices, cease its sale of pre-packaged tax 
products, and restrict its tax preparation services); Coffee, supra note 74, at 13 (discussing the 
dangers of prosecutors pursuing corporate governance reform through the use of DPAs and 
NPAs). 
 82 See Julie R. O’Sullivan, How Prosecutors Apply the “Federal Prosecutions of Corpora-
tions” Charging Policy in the Era of Deferred Prosecutions, and What That Means for the Pur-
poses of the Federal Criminal Sanction, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 29, 69–70 (2014) (explaining that 
prosecutors do not have the financial training or wherewithal necessary to implement DPAs that 
will effectively change a corporation’s structure for the better); Coffee, supra note 74, at 13 (argu-
ing that DPAs have deeply encroached into matters of corporate governance and that the mandated 
reforms equal experimentation in corporate governance by prosecutors lacking the experience 
necessary to believe that such reforms will result in effective deterrence). 
 83 See Uhlmann, supra note 13, at 1329 (questioning whether this authority exists).  
 84 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) (2012). 
 85 See Uhlmann, supra note 13, at 1337 (arguing that the DOJ’s increased use of DPAs and 
NPAs contravenes DOJ policy). 
 86 See, e.g., John S. Baker, Jr., Reforming Corporations Through Threats of Federal Prosecu-
tion, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 310, 312–13 (2004) (proposing that Federal criminal law does not ad-
dress corporate reform and that Congress’s delegation of criminal enforcement power has allowed 
the DOJ to implement policies unapproved by Congress). 
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use of DPAs and NPAs in an attempt to reform corporate culture contradicts 
mandates outlined in the United States Attorney’s Manual (“USAM”).87 
The USAM states that DPAs or NPAs can be used in exchange for coop-
eration, but should only be used if that same cooperation cannot be obtained 
through a plea agreement or alternative agreement that preserves the DOJ’s 
ability to pursue criminal charges.88 Indeed, the USAM expresses a strong 
preference for obtaining cooperation through plea agreements that reduce 
charges or involve sentencing considerations.89 According to the USAM, ob-
taining a plea agreement is vastly superior to allowing a wrongdoer to escape 
liability though a NPA or DPA.90 Of course, it is difficult to ascertain the 
lengths that the DOJ normally goes in order to secure cooperation before us-
ing DPAs or NPAs.91 Nevertheless, given the overwhelming use of DPAs and 
NPAs since the release of the Thompson Memo in 2003, it seems unlikely 
that the DOJ is only using these agreements where it cannot otherwise obtain 
cooperation.92 
Further, according to the USAM, even where prosecutors establish that a 
NPA or DPA is the only available avenue for successfully obtaining coopera-
tion, they still must conduct a balancing test to determine whether foregoing 
prosecution is in the public interest.93 In addition to this test, the manual also 
provides that, because the primary function of a federal prosecutor is to en-
force the criminal law, DPAs and NPAs should be used only under very lim-
                                                                                                                           
 87 See U.S. ATTORNEY’S MANUAL § 9-27.600 (providing limitations on the use of DPAs and 
NPAs); Uhlmann, supra note 13, at 1338–39 (discussing the U.S. Attorney’s Manual’s (“USAM”) 
mandates). 
 88 U.S. ATTORNEY’S MANUAL § 9-27.600; see Thompson Memo, supra note 50, at 6 (“[A] 
non prosecution agreement in exchange for cooperation when a corporation’s ‘timely cooperation 
appears to be necessary to the public interest and other means of obtaining the desired cooperation 
are unavailable or would not be effective.’”) (citation omitted). 
 89 U.S. ATTORNEY’S MANUAL § 9-27.600. 
 90 Id. § 9-27.600(B)(2) (stating that a plea agreement is “clearly preferable to permitting an 
offender to avoid any liability for [its] conduct” and that “the possible use of an alternative to a 
non-prosecution agreement should be given serious consideration in the first instance”). The 
USAM also strongly favors guilty plea agreements over the use of nolo contendere pleas. Id. § 9-
27.500 (stating that DOJ attorneys should reject a nolo contendere plea unless the supervising 
Assistant Attorney General “concludes that the circumstances of the case are so unusual that ac-
ceptance of such a plea would be in the public interest”). With a nolo contendere plea, the defend-
ant does not contest her guilt or innocence, waives her right to trial, is formally convicted of the 
crime, and accepts punishment as if she had pled guilty. Mark Gurevich, Justice Department’s 
Policy of Opposing Nolo Contendere Pleas: A Justification, 6 CAL. CRIM. L. REV. 2, 10–14 
(2004). The biggest difference between this plea and a guilty plea is that with a nolo contendere 
plea, the defendant does not admit her guilt. Id. 
 91 See Uhlmann, supra note 13, at 1339 (suggesting that the DOJ’s frequent use of DPAs and 
NPAs is not limited to situations where cooperation cannot be obtained through other avenues). 
 92 Id. 
 93 U.S. ATTORNEY’S MANUAL § 9-27.600–.620. This public interest balancing test requires 
weighing (1) the importance of the case, (2) the value of the cooperation, and (3) the relative cul-
pability and criminal history of the defendant. Id. § 9-27.620(A). 
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ited circumstances.94 As the manual points out, DPAs and NPAS are agree-
ments to avoid enforcing the law when certain conditions are present.95 
Again, even without full knowledge of individual federal prosecutors con-
ducting these balancing tests, the explosion in the use of NPAs and DPAs, 
including with serious, repeat corporate offenders, suggests that these agree-
ments are being used as a primary prosecutorial tool without full considera-
tion of potential damage to the public.96 
Third, as many commentators have explained, there is a distinct lack of 
judicial monitoring of DPAs and NPAs, leading to a lack of accountability, 
neutrality, and effectiveness of the agreements.97 With DPAs, there is some 
limited oversight—deferred prosecution depends on a court approving a 
waiver of the relevant statute of limitations—but this oversight is mechanical 
at best.98 It is exceedingly rare that a court rejects a DPA, allowing federal 
prosecutors and corporate actors to freely enter into agreements regardless of 
potential harm to the public.99 With NPAs, there is no judicial oversight at all 
because charges are never filed.100 The agreements are simply contracts be-
tween the government and the defendant.101 For both DPAs and NPAs, the 
                                                                                                                           
 94 Id. § 9-27.620(B)(1). 
 95 Id. (“[S]ince the primary function of a federal prosecution . . . is to enforce the criminal 
law, a federal prosecutor should not routinely or indiscriminately enter into non-prosecution 
agreements, which are, in essence, agreements not to enforce the law under particular condi-
tions.”). 
 96 See United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., No. 12-CR-763, 2013 WL 3306161, at *7–9 
(E.D.N.Y. July 1, 2013) (noting that, in spite of criticism for avoiding criminal liability, the dis-
trict judge deferred to the Executive Branch in upholding the use of the DPA); Peter J. Henning, 
Many Messages in the G.M. Settlement, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Sept. 21, 2015), http://www.
nytimes.com/2015/09/22/business/dealbook/many-messages-in-the-gm-settlement.html [https://
perma.cc/RJM6-4UC9] (explaining that the DOJ used a DPA in the GM fraud case in hopes of 
deterring future corporate misconduct but also explaining that this DPA was relatively weak com-
pared to other corporate fraud cases); Shane Strowmatt et al., Deutsche Bank to Pay $2.5 Billion 
to End LIBOR Probe, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 23, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2015-04-23/deutsche-bank-to-pay-record-2-5-billion-to-resolve-libor-probes [https://perma.cc/8TKH-
G994] (reporting on DPA used in Deutsche Bank settlement); Deutsche Bank’s London Subsidiary 
Agrees to Plead Guilty in Connection with Long-Running Manipulation of LIBOR, DEP’T OF JUS-
TICE (Apr. 23, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/deutsche-banks-london-subsidiary-agrees-
plead-guilty-connection-long-running-manipulation [https://perma.cc/CEG8-9XF7] (discussing 
DPA used to resolve Deutsche Bank’s fraud charges). 
 97 Uhlmann, supra note 13, at 1328. But see HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 2013 WL 3306161, at 
*4–5 (holding that courts have authority to reject deferred prosecution agreements pursuant to 
their power to uphold the integrity of judicial proceedings). 
 98 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) (2012); Uhlmann, supra note 13, at 1328. 
 99 Garrett, supra note 62, at 893. 
 100 See id. at 924 (noting that there is no statutorily required review for NPAs); Wray & Hur, 
supra note 39, at 1105 (explaining that with NPAs, the DOJ does not file any charges at all, and 
individuals are allowed to completely avoid prosecution in exchange for cooperation as required 
in the agreement). 
 101 Garrett, supra note 62, at 928–29. Although there is some judicial oversight in that the 
agreement is judicially enforceable and the government maintains the right to prosecute the corpo-
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judiciary does not monitor compliance with the agreements, and often, com-
panies are left to self-regulate their compliance.102 
Fourth, research suggests that DPAs and NPAs simply do not provide 
the same deterrent effect on corporate misconduct as criminal prosecutions.103 
Allowing corporations to escape prosecution with monetary fines and agree-
ments to reform their business practices creates less incentive to abstain from 
further criminal conduct.104 DPAs and NPAs make it possible for corporations 
to calculate the monetary risk of criminal business practices and decide to 
bear the risk due to the potential financial gains of the practices.105 Commen-
tators explain that this lack of a possible criminal indictment fails to deter 
corporate officers from engaging in such criminal practices.106 
Additionally, and perhaps most importantly, full criminal prosecution 
expresses societal condemnation of an act that cannot be replicated with 
DPAs and NPAs.107 Criminal prosecution and conviction stigmatizes defend-
                                                                                                                           
ration if the corporation breaks the agreement, there is still no judicial oversight over the entry into 
the initial agreement. Wray & Hur, supra note 39, at 1105. 
 102 Ellis W. Martin, Deferred Prosecution Agreements: ‘Too Big to Jail’ and the Potential of 
Judicial Oversight Combined with Congressional Legislation, 18 N.C. BANKING INST. 457, 468 
(2014). 
 103 See Reilly, supra note 73, at 345 (discussing the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development’s study that found that DPAs’ deterrent effect was unknown). 
 104 See Martin, supra note 102, at 468 (stating that allowing corporations to escape criminal 
sanctions with fines and unmonitored commitments to pursue internal reforms fails to deter future 
criminal misconduct). 
 105 See Randall D. Eliason, We Need to Indict Them: Deferred Prosecution Agreements Won’t 
Deter Enough Corporate Crime, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 22, 2008, at 54 (indicating that without the 
threat of criminal liability, corporate executives will be more willing to push their conduct to the 
limits of legality as engaging in criminal activity becomes a simple cost-benefit analysis). 
 106 See Martin, supra note 102, at 469 (“DPAs may make it financially viable for corporations 
to bear the risk of criminal business practices due to financial gains made from such practices 
without the threat of an indictment.”); see also Eric Lichtblau, In Justice Shift, Corporate Deals 
Replace Trials, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/09/washington/09
justice.html [https://perma.cc/HP7D-VCK2] (questioning the deterrent effect of DPAs). Recent 
studies into the effectiveness of DPAs and NPAs confirm suspicions regarding their lack of deter-
rence. Reilly, supra note 73, at 345. For example, the U.S. Government Accountability Office 
(“GAO”) has come to the conclusion that the DOJ is not able to evaluate DPA and NPA effective-
ness in combatting corporate crime. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-10-110, COR-
PORATE CRIME: DOJ HAS TAKEN STEPS TO BETTER TRACK ITS USE OF DEFERRED AND NON-
PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS, BUT SHOULD EVALUATE EFFECTIVENESS 1 (2009). The GAO con-
cluded that the “DOJ cannot evaluate and demonstrate the extent to which DPAs and NPAs . . . 
contribute to the department’s efforts to combat corporate crime because it has no measures to 
assess their effectiveness,” and “[t]herefore, it could be difficult for DOJ to justify its increasing 
use of these tools.” Id. at 20. A similar report that the Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development issued, in addressing Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcement, stated that any 
deterrence effect of DPAs or NPAs has not been quantified. OECD WORKING GRP. ON BRIBERY, 
PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION IN THE UNITED 
STATES 20 (2010). 
 107 Uhlmann, supra note 13, at 1336. 
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ants in a manner that fines, penalties, and corporate reform agreements do 
not.108 When conduct is criminalized, prosecutors send a message to the rest 
of society that such conduct will not be tolerated and will be discouraged by 
society.109 This stigmatization harms an individual’s reputation above and 
beyond the financial consequences of NPAs and DPAs that can be accounted 
for merely as the cost of doing business.110 
Finally, the use of NPAs and DPAs for repeat, serious offenders cannot 
be reconciled with any conception of criminal law enforcement and conflicts 
with the DOJ’s own criminal prosecution regulations.111 As Part I of this Note 
stated, DPAs and NPAs became more commonplace after the Thompson 
Memo was issued in 2003.112 Specifically, they were utilized in conjunction 
with the Thompson Memo’s emphasis on pretrial diversion and cooperation 
with corporate wrongdoers.113 The DOJ, however, has traditionally limited 
pretrial diversion to less serious crimes and to individuals with little or no 
criminal history.114 Yet after 2003, the DOJ increasingly utilized DPAs and 
NPAs, forms of pretrial diversion, with corporations that had serious criminal 
histories.115 Allowing egregious criminal misconduct to escape criminal pros-
ecution undermines deterrence of corporate misconduct and contorts the tra-
ditional pretrial diversion model that originally spawned the use of DPAs and 
NPAs.116 
Ultimately, the overarching problem with the DOJ’s pre-Yates Memo 
corporate prosecution policy is that, by using DPAs and NPAs as a substitute 
                                                                                                                           
 108 Id.; see John L. Diamond, The Crisis in the Ideology of Crime, 31 IND. L. REV. 291, 311 
(1998) (arguing that criminal law diverges from civil law because criminal law censures wrongdo-
ers); Dan Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 598 (1996) (ob-
serving that government abstention from criminal enforcement could be viewed as approval of the 
wrongdoing). 
 109 See Diamond, supra note 108, at 311 (explaining that a society’s ideology is reflected in 
the acts that it chooses to criminalize). 
 110 Uhlmann, supra note 13, at 1335. 
 111 Id. at 1337. 
 112 Uhlmann, supra note 13, at 1337; see Thompson Memo, supra note 50, at 6 (introducing, 
for the first time, NPAs and DPAs as a tool for gaining cooperation from corporations); supra 
notes 55–57 (explaining the rise of the DOJ’s use of DPAs and NPAs in the wake of the Thomp-
son Memo’s release in 2003). 
 113 Uhlmann, supra note 13, at 1337. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. One particularly enlightening example of the DOJ’s misuse of NPAs and DPAs on 
serious offenders is the HSBC case. See HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 2013 WL 3306161, at *7. After a 
lengthy investigation, the global bank, HSBC, was found to have laundered nearly a billion dollars 
for clients such as drug traffickers and international terrorist organizations, yet such stunning 
criminal misconduct was met with a DPA. Id. at *8–9; Uhlmann, supra note 13, at 1337. Incredi-
bly, not one individual employee of HSBC was criminally prosecuted. See Uhlmann, supra note 
13, at 1338. 
 116 See Uhlmann, supra note 13, at 1338 (discussing how historical use of DPAs and NPAs 
fails to address the criminality of corporate misconduct). 
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for criminal prosecution, the DOJ eroded the entire idea of corporate actor 
criminality.117 If, after investigating a case of corporate wrongdoing, a prose-
cutor decides the conduct involved is too egregious to avoid criminal charges, 
then the prosecutor should pursue criminal charges.118 By deciding that the 
criminal conduct can be addressed through a non-criminal alternative such as 
a DPA, the prosecutor betrays her own determination about the egregiousness 
of the conduct.119 In the end, an agreement such as a DPA signals that a cor-
porate defendant can undo the criminal acts of its individual employees if it 
agrees to an attractive enough deal with the prosecutor.120 
II. THE YATES MEMO: WILL THIS CHANGE IN POLICY SOLVE THE 
PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE DOJ’S PROSECUTION  
STRATEGY FOR CORPORATE CRIME? 
On September 9, 2015, Deputy Attorney General Sally Yates issued a 
memorandum (the “Yates Memo”) in response to consistent criticism that the 
DOJ was failing in its efforts to hold individuals accountable for their role in 
corporate criminal scandals.121 Specifically, the memo announced new DOJ 
policy to increasingly target individuals involved in corporate crimes and 
provided guidelines for how this goal of individual accountability would be 
met.122 Nevertheless, two examples of post-Yates Memo prosecutorial fail-
ures in particular call into question the effect that the memo’s guidelines will 
have on holding individuals accountable for corporate crime.123 Section A of 
                                                                                                                           
 117 Id. at 1341. 
 118 Id. 
 119 See id. (noting that prosecutors should apply sound discretion when considering prosecut-
ing crimes). 
 120 See id. at 1302 (arguing that the use of DPAs and NPAs erodes deterrence of corporate 
criminal activity, undermines the rule of law, and eradicates reputation harm that coincides with 
criminal prosecution). 
 121 Yates Memo, supra note 26; Johnston, supra note 22. Indeed, the Memo’s first paragraphs 
attempt to assuage critics by reassuring them that fighting corporate crime and holding individuals 
accountable is a “top priority of the Department of Justice.” Yates Memo, supra note 26. 
 122 See Yates Memo, supra note 26, at 2 (“[T]he Department [must] fully leverage its re-
sources to identify culpable individuals . . . in corporate cases. To address these challenges . . . . 
[the Memo] identifie[s] areas . . . [to] amend its policies . . . to most effectively pursue the indi-
viduals responsible for corporate wrongs.”). 
 123 See Critics Rip GM Deferred Prosecution Agreement in Engine Switch Case, CORP. 
CRIME REP. (Sept. 17, 2015), http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/news/200/critics-rip-gm-
deferred-prosecution-in-switch-case/ [https://perma.cc/W3AN-Y7WG] (discussing the DOJ’s 
settlement for GM ignition switch fraud); For-Profit College Company to Pay $95.5 Million to 
Settle Claims of Illegal Recruiting, Consumer Fraud, and Other Violations, DEP’T OF JUSTICE 
(Nov. 16, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/profit-college-company-pay-955-million-settle-
claims-illegal-recruiting-consumer-fraud-and [https://perma.cc/4L63-CSEU] (reporting on the 
Education Management Corp. settlement). See OFFICE OF SEN. ELIZABETH WARREN, RIGGED 
JUSTICE: 2016: HOW WEAK ENFORCEMENT LETS CORPORATE OFFENDERS OFF EASY (2016) 
[hereinafter RIGGED JUSTICE]. 
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this Part examines the Yates Memo in detail and discusses the manner in 
which the announced change in policy attempts to address the failure to effec-
tively prosecute the individuals responsible for corporate crime.124 Section B 
then discusses specific post-Yates Memo examples of the DOJ’s continued 
failure to hold individuals accountable for corporate crime.125 
A. The Yates Memo: The DOJ Shifts Its Focus Away from Cooperation 
The Yates Memo identified six key prosecutorial principles that are 
meant to strengthen the DOJ’s ability to prosecute individual corporate 
wrongdoing.126 The principles focused on predicating credit for corporate 
cooperation on identification of responsible individuals and ensuring a prose-
cutorial emphasis on individual liability throughout corporate criminal inves-
tigations.127 
The first policy principle dictates that to receive cooperation credit, cor-
porations must disclose relevant facts about individual responsibility for mis-
conduct.128 Further, despite this emphasis on cooperation, the memo makes 
clear that DOJ investigators must not rely solely on cooperation to identify 
responsible individuals.129 Investigators are instructed to vigorously investi-
gate any potentially culpable individuals, closely review any information pro-
                                                                                                                           
 124 See infra notes 126–146 and accompanying text. 
 125 See infra notes 147–163 and accompanying text. 
 126 Yates Memo, supra note 26, at 2 (“The guidance in this memo reflects six key steps to 
strengthen our pursuit of individual corporate wrongdoing . . . .”). 
 127 Id. at 2–3. The six specific principles are as follows: (1) in order for a corporation to ac-
quire cooperation credit, it must provide the DOJ with all relevant facts relating to individuals 
responsible for the corporate misconduct; (2) individual responsibility should be the focus of crim-
inal and civil corporate investigations from the beginning of an investigation; (3) civil and crimi-
nal attorneys conducting corporate investigations should maintain regular communication with 
each other regarding potential individual liability; (4) absent extraordinary circumstances, the DOJ 
will not provide immunity to culpable individuals when resolving a corporate investigation; (5) 
corporate investigations should not be resolved without a clear plan to hold related individuals 
accountable; and (6) civil attorneys should focus on bringing suit against individuals as well as 
corporations, taking into account deterrence and accountability in addition to ability to pay. Id. 
 128 Id. at 3 (stating that, in order for a corporation to receive any consideration for coopera-
tion, the corporation must completely disclose all relevant facts related to individual wrongdoing). 
The memo even goes so far as to state that if a corporation seeking cooperation credit fails to pro-
actively learn of individual wrongdoing, its cooperation will not be considered a mitigating factor: 
[T]o be eligible for any credit for cooperation, the company must identify all indi-
viduals involved in or responsible for the misconduct at issue, regardless of their po-
sition, status or seniority, and provide to the Department all facts relating to that 
misconduct. If a company seeking cooperation credit declines to learn of such facts 
or to provide the Department with complete factual information about individual 
wrongdoers, its cooperation will not be considered a mitigating factor pursuant to 
USAM 9-28.700. 
Id. 
 129 Id. at 4. 
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vided by the corporation, and compare disclosed information with internal 
DOJ investigative materials to ensure that the disclosed information does not 
omit any evidence of individual responsibility.130 
The second principle mandates a focus on individual responsibility from 
the inception of corporate criminal investigations.131 The memo emphasizes 
that this focus will help prosecutors discover the full extent of corporate 
wrongdoing, as corporate criminal activity can only occur through the con-
duct of individuals.132 It will also help prosecutors identify lower level indi-
viduals with knowledge of criminal conduct at the executive level.133 Ulti-
mately, the memo stresses that this focus on individuals from the beginning 
will maximize the possibility that, upon resolution of the investigation, indi-
viduals will be held criminally liable.134 
The third principle requires parallel development of civil and criminal 
proceedings.135 DOJ attorneys are instructed to consider every possible poten-
tial remedy (e.g., jail time, financial penalties, damages, or suspension) when 
considering how to best hold an individual accountable.136 If the DOJ is pursu-
ing criminal sanctions against an individual, but there exists an issue with bur-
den of proof or mens rea under the criminal statute, then the criminal attorneys 
should consult with the civil attorneys in order to assess possible civil remedies 
and vice versa.137 Overall, the memo stresses coordination with the civil attor-
neys as a means to ensure that all avenues of potential liability are pursued.138 
The fourth guideline provides that no corporate deal will provide culpa-
ble individuals with immunity from criminal or civil liability.139 The memo 
states that absent approved departmental policy, DOJ lawyers will not release 
claims of individual criminal liability without written approval from the rele-
vant Assistant Attorney General or U.S. Attorney.140 
In a similar vein, the fifth principle states that investigations into corpo-
rate wrongdoing should not be closed without a clear plan to pursue related 
                                                                                                                           
 130 Id. (explaining that the DOJ should not rely on corporations to voluntarily cooperate re-
garding culpable individuals, and additionally, that the DOJ should not accept information regard-
ing culpable individuals without conducting its own independent investigation into the infor-
mation). 
 131 Id. at 4. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Id. 
 135 Id. at 4–5. 
 136 Id. at 5. 
 137 Id. 
 138 Id. at 4–5. 
 139 Id. at 5 (providing that, even if the DOJ reaches a deal with a corporation before investi-
gating any culpable individuals, the deal should never prohibit future prosecution of culpable 
individuals within the corporation). 
 140 Id. 
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individual cases in a timely and effective manner.141 The memo states that a 
memorandum should be prepared at the close of the investigation which in-
cludes a discussion of potentially culpable individuals, a description of the 
current investigations into liable individuals, and a plan to bring the individu-
al matters to a close before the end of any statute of limitations period.142 If 
DOJ attorneys eventually decide not to bring charges against identified cul-
pable individuals, the appropriate U.S. Attorney or Assistant Attorney General 
must approve the memorialized reasons for this determination.143 
Finally, the sixth guideline states that civil attorneys should vigorously 
pursue liable individuals as well as corporate bodies, despite the fact that the 
corporate bodies will have a significantly greater ability to pay high judg-
ments.144 The Memo reminds DOJ attorneys that civil enforcement is not on-
ly about recovering as much money as possible from corporate wrongdoers, 
but also about holding individual wrongdoers accountable and deterring fu-
ture individual wrongdoing.145 Although cases against individuals may not 
return as much monetarily compared to cases against corporations, the memo 
makes clear that findings of individual civil liability will have a long-term 
deterrent effect.146 
B. Two Examples of the Yates Memo’s Practical Ineffectiveness 
Although the Yates Memo’s six prosecutorial guidelines are a step in the 
right direction, many commentators have pointed out that they are simply a 
restatement of the DOJ’s already longstanding policy of targeting individu-
als.147 Indeed, some have even gone so far as to state that the new rules are 
                                                                                                                           
 141 Id. at 6. 
 142 Id.  
 143 Id. 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. at 6–7. The Memo provides: 
[C]ivil enforcement efforts are designed not only to return government money to the 
public fisc, but also to hold the wrongdoers accountable and to deter future wrong-
doing . . . . In certain circumstances, though, these dual goals can be in apparent ten-
sion with one another, for example . . . whether to pursue civil actions against indi-
vidual[s] . . . who may not have the necessary financial resources to pay a significant 
judgment. 
Id. at 6. 
 146 Id. at 6–7. 
 147 E.g., Richard Cullen & George Terwilliger III, Unpacking the Yates Memo: What the 
“New” DOJ Policy Really Means, JD SUPRA BUS. ADVISOR (Sept. 14, 2015), http://www.jdsupra.
com/legalnews/unpacking-the-yates-memo-what-the-new-23021 [https://perma.cc/L89H-4J8S]; 
Priya Cherian Huskins, The Yates Memo: What Is It and What You Need to Know, WOODRUFF 
SAWYER & COMPANY: D&O NOTEBOOK (Oct. 6, 2015), https://wsandco.com/do-notebook/yates-
memo/ [https://perma.cc/GTP9-W4VX]. 
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merely symbolic public messaging.148 The following two examples of post-
Yates Memo prosecutorial failures reinforce this sentiment and highlight the 
fact that the memo’s guidelines did not go quite far enough in the effort to end 
impunity for individual corporate criminals.149 
The first example of the DOJ’s post-Yates Memo continuing failure to 
hold individuals accountable for corporate crime is the Department’s case 
against Education Management Corporation (“EDMC”).150 In November 2015, 
the DOJ settled its civil case with EDMC, the second largest for-profit educa-
tion company in the country.151 EDMC unlawfully recruited students by em-
ploying high-pressure recruiters who used misleading and deceptive recruit-
ment tactics and whose payment was based exclusively on the number of stu-
dents they were able to enroll.152 This conduct plainly violated multiple federal 
statutes meant to protect students from deceitful recruitment schemes.153 
Despite these extensive scam recruiting tactics, which harmed countless 
students and taxpayers alike, the DOJ settled its claims against EDMC for 
only $95 million in fines, did not sanction even one executive, did not restrict 
the flow of future federal funds to EDMC, and did not force EDMC to admit 
to any wrongdoing.154 By the DOJ’s own admission, EDMC’s conduct was 
an “egregious abuse” that allowed corporate officers to get rich to the detri-
ment of dedicated students who were left saddled with outrageous levels of 
                                                                                                                           
 148 E.g., Matt Apuzzo & Ben Protess, Justice Department Sets Sights on Wall Street Execu-
tives, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/10/us/politics/new-justice-
dept-rules-aimed-at-prosecuting-corporate-executives.html [https://perma.cc/72AF-GN94]. 
 149 See RIGGED JUSTICE, supra note 123 (highlighting the DOJ’s settlement with EDMC and 
the DPA with GM as examples of the DOJ’s continuing failure to effectively prosecute individuals 
involved in corporate wrongdoing); Critics Rip GM Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 
123 (reporting on the DOJ’s DPA with GM regarding GM’s fraudulent cover up of a faulty igni-
tion switch problem in its vehicles); For-Profit College Company to Pay $95.5 Million, supra note 
123 (discussing the DOJ’s civil settlement with EDMC stemming from EDMC’s unlawful student 
recruitment tactics). 
 150 For-Profit College Company to Pay $95.5 Million, supra note 123. 
 151 Id. 
 152 Id. (“EDMC unlawfully recruited students, in contravention of the [Higher Education 
Act’s] Incentive Compensation Ban . . . , by running a high pressure boiler room where admis-
sions personnel were paid based purely on the number of students they enrolled.”). 
 153 See id. Specifically, EDMC’s actions violated Title IV of the Higher Education Act’s 
(HEA) Incentive Compensation Ban (ICB), which prohibits schools from paying recruiters based 
purely on their recruitment success. Id. EDMC also violated the False Claims Act by falsely certi-
fying that it was in compliance with the HEA. Id. In total, EDMC received approximately $11 
billion in payments, ninety percent through federal student grants and loans, due to these fraudu-
lent recruitment tactics. Letter from Sens. Elizabeth Warren, Richard Durbin, and Richard Blu-
menthal to the Honorable Loretta Lynch, Att’y Gen. of the United States, and the Honorable Arne 
Duncan, U.S. Sec’y of Educ. (Nov. 30, 2015). 
 154 For-Profit College Company to Pay $95.5 Million, supra note 123. The $95 million fine 
equaled less than one percent of the $11 billion that EDMC received through its fraudulent tactics. 
Letter from Sens. Elizabeth Warren, Richard Durbin, and Richard Blumenthal, supra note 153. 
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student debt and no discernible employment qualifications.155 As Senator 
Elizabeth Warren noted in her letter to the DOJ following the conclusion of 
the case, this settlement was unfathomable and in direct contradiction to the 
Yates Memo’s announced strategy to hold individuals accountable for corpo-
rate criminality.156 
The second example of the Yates Memo’s ineffectiveness in holding in-
dividuals accountable for corporate criminality is the September 2015 Gen-
eral Motors (“GM”) DPA.157 Over the course of several years, GM fraudu-
lently covered up ignition switch problems in its vehicles, resulting in at least 
124 deaths and 275 injuries.158 Despite this extensive death toll, GM was only 
fined $900 million and entered into a three-year DPA regarding relevant crim-
inal charges.159 Significantly, no individuals were held civilly accountable for 
the fraudulent cover up, nor was a single criminal charge filed against any 
individuals.160 
These above examples suggest that the commentators questioning the 
real impact of the Yates Memo were not completely off base; the Memo did 
not do enough to truly reform DOJ practices and is acting mostly as a sym-
bolic gesture.161 The DOJ has always publicly stated that it will focus on 
prosecuting individuals, and the Yates Memo reinforcement of this principle 
seemingly does not add much to the equation.162 The DOJ is still utilizing 
                                                                                                                           
 155 For-Profit College Company to Pay $95.5 Million, supra note 123 (stating that EDMC 
“enrich[ed] their corporate coffers at the expense of students seeking a quality education” and 
caused “the enrollment of students in programs for which they lacked the necessary skills and 
qualifications, unsustainable student debt and default rates and [placed] schools’ pursuit of profits 
ahead of a legitimate education mission”). 
 156 Letter from Sens. Elizabeth Warren, Richard Durbin, and Richard Blumenthal, supra note 
153 (declaring that the EDMC settlement was “inexplicable and [ran] counter to a highly-touted 
new DOJ policy on ‘Individual Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing’ that was announced on 
September 16, 2015”). 
 157 RIGGED JUSTICE, supra note 123, at 3. University of Maryland Law Professor Rena Steinzor 
expressed dismay at the settlement, stating: “This settlement is shamefully weak . . . . Much harsher 
penalties and individual prosecutions are warranted. The deferred prosecution is a toothless way of 
approaching a very serious problem.” Critics Rip GM Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 
123. She went on to state, “So much for the Justice Department’s new strong policy on individual 
prosecution.” Id. University of Virginia Law Professor Brandon Garrett echoed these sentiments, 
stating: “It is deeply disturbing if GM settles this case in a deferred prosecution, out of court, and 
with no individuals charged.” Id. 
 158 RIGGED JUSTICE, supra note 123, at 3; Henning, supra note 96. 
 159 RIGGED JUSTICE, supra note 123, at 3. 
 160 Id. 
 161 Apuzzo & Protess, supra note 148. 
 162 Thomas Gorman & Nick Akerman, The Yates Memo: A New DOJ Investigative Approach, 
DORSEY (Sept. 21, 2015), https://www.dorsey.com/newsresources/publications/client-alerts/2015/
09/the-yates-memo-a-new-doj-investigative-approach. 
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DPAs over full prosecution and individuals involved in corporate crime are 
still avoiding accountability.163 
III. THE YATES MEMO DOES NOT GO FAR ENOUGH: WHAT THE DOJ  
CAN DO TO ENSURE MORE EFFECTIVE PROSECUTION OF THE  
INDIVIDUALS RESPONSIBLE FOR CORPORATE CRIME 
No matter the DOJ’s justification for its overwhelming use of DPAs and 
NPAs in place of individual prosecution, the DOJ’s failure to effectively pun-
ish culpable corporate executives who violate the law is undermining the 
United States’ legal foundations.164 Although the Yates Memo’s six prosecu-
torial guidelines are a step in the right direction towards accountability for 
corporate criminals, the memo does not address the biggest obstacle to hold-
ing individuals accountable for criminal corporate conduct—the DOJ’s over-
use of DPAs and NPAs.165 
By not explicitly limiting the use of DPAs and NPAs, the Yates Memo 
fails to ensure effective prosecution of the individuals responsible for corpo-
rate crime, fails to deter corporate actors from breaking the law, denies victims 
of corporate crime a fair chance at any semblance of justice, and calls into 
question the United States’ promise of equal justice to all citizens regardless of 
wealth, status, or influence.166 This final Part offers suggestions to improve 
                                                                                                                           
 163 See generally RIGGED JUSTICE, supra note 123 (detailing the DOJ’s continuing failure to 
hold individuals responsible for corporate crime). 
 164 Id. at 1; see also Deferred Prosecution Agreements: A Better Option Than Indictment?, 
METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., May 2008 (demonstrating, through an interview with U.S. Attor-
ney Bryan Blaney, that DPAs are most often used by prosecutors to prevent criminal charges 
against individuals when the government seeks financial penalties and future restrictions on con-
duct, but does not believe imprisonment is a necessary penalty); Reilly, supra note 73, at 350–51 
(detailing the negative consequences of the DOJ’s reliance on DPAs and NPAs in the corporate 
crime context); Jesse Eisinger, Seeking Tough Justice, but Settling for Empty Promises, N.Y. 
TIMES: DEALBOOK (May 7, 2014), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/05/07/seeking-tough-justice-
but-settling-for-empty-promises/ [https://perma.cc/8DLZ-96FX] (pointing out that charges were not 
brought against individuals in either of two highly-publicized cases involving HSBC and Toyota, 
both of which involved significant levels of individual criminal conduct but were still resolved 
through DPAs); Ben Protess & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, BNP Paribas Admits Guilt and Agrees to 
Pay $8.9 Billion Fine to U.S., N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (June 30, 2014), http://dealbook.nytimes.
com/2014/06/30/bnp-paribas-pleads-guilty-in-sanctions-case [https://perma.cc/SE9U-CNBX] (ex-
plaining that, although BNP pled guilty to various crimes and paid an $8.9 billion penalty, no 
individual BNP employees were criminally charged); Rakoff, supra note 1 (stating that in the 
most recent decade, federal prosecutors have been reluctant to indict, charge, or fully prosecute 
any individuals responsible for corporate crime). 
 165 See Uhlmann, supra note 13, at 1302 (explaining the negative consequences stemming 
from the DOJ’s overuse of DPAs and NPAs); supra notes 50–60 and accompanying text (explain-
ing the rise in the DOJ’s use of DPAs and NPAs from 2001 through the present, to the point where 
they have come to dominate the DOJ’s corporate prosecution strategy). 
 166 See RIGGED JUSTICE, supra note 123, at 1 (“The Obama Administration has made repeat-
ed promises to strengthen enforcement and hold corporate criminals accountable, and the DOJ 
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DOJ policies in order to ensure that the promises of the Yates Memo—
successful prosecution of the individuals responsible for corporate miscon-
duct—are brought to fruition.167 Section A offers the most drastic proposal: the 
DOJ’s full elimination of NPAs and DPAs.168 Section B then provides more 
modest amendments to the USAM meant to significantly curtail the use of 
NPAs and DPAs.169 
A. Fully Eliminate the Use of NPAs and DPAs 
The first proposal is radical: fully eradicate the use of NPAs and DPAs 
for individuals responsible for corporate crime.170 The DOJ could release a 
memo, which would amend the USAM, to outlaw the use of DPAs or NPAs, 
and prosecutors would be left with the two options that were available before 
the introduction of NPAs and DPAs: prosecution or declination.171 If the ap-
plicable law and facts at hand call for full prosecution, then federal prosecu-
tors would be forced to bring charges.172 On the other hand, if the prosecutor 
feels as though the conduct at hand does not warrant criminal prosecution, 
then charges would be declined.173 This policy provision would force prose-
cutors to engage in their primary function—to enforce the law—and prevent 
them from engaging in DPA-type agreements, which, by their own admission, 
are “agreements not to enforce the law under particular conditions.”174 
Further, after forcing corporate defendants to face full criminal charges, 
defendants would then have to decide to challenge the charges at trial or opt 
for a plea bargain, where many of the advantages of DPAs and NPAs would 
then be available.175 Plea bargains can guarantee (1) restitution payments to 
                                                                                                                           
announced in September that it would place greater emphasis on charging individuals responsible 
for corporate crimes. Nonetheless, both before and after this DOJ announcement, accountability 
for corporate crimes is shockingly weak.”); Reilly, supra note 73, at 357 (explaining the unjust 
and unfair use of DPAs as methods of enforcing corporate criminal law); Uhlmann, supra note 13, 
at 1344 (discussing the negative impacts of NPAs and DPAs). 
 167 See infra notes 170–203 and accompanying text. 
 168 See infra notes 170–189 and accompanying text. 
 169 See infra notes 192–203 and accompanying text. 
 170 See U.S. ATTORNEY’S MANUAL § 9-28.200–210 (explaining that, in spite of directives to 
focus investigations on individual wrongdoers, NPAs and DPAs still “occupy an important middle 
ground between declining prosecution and obtaining the conviction of a corporation”); Reilly, 
supra note 73, at 351 (“DPAs serve as a disturbing wellspring of unfairness, double standards, and 
potential abuse of power.”). 
 171 Reilly, supra note 73, at 357. 
 172 Id. 
 173 Uhlmann, supra note 13, at 1344. 
 174 U.S. ATTORNEY’S MANUAL § 9-27.620(B)(1) (“Since the primary function of a federal 
prosecution . . . is to enforce the criminal law, a federal prosecutor should not routinely or indis-
criminately enter into non-prosecution agreements, which are, in essence, agreements not to en-
force the law under particular conditions.”). 
 175 Reilly, supra note 73, at 357. 
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victims, (2) cooperation in naming additional responsible individuals, (3) 
corporate reform agreements, and (4) guidance to other individuals and cor-
porate bodies regarding compliance with relevant criminal statutes.176 And 
although plea bargains are also subject to abuse, they at least require actual 
prosecution of culpable individuals and an admission of guilt, which results in 
criminal stigmatization absent from a DPA or NPA.177  
Importantly, this proposal does not ignore the lessons learned from the 
disastrous Arthur Andersen prosecution.178 As explained earlier, the DOJ was 
heavily criticized for the vast collateral consequences to innocent third parties 
that the Arthur Andersen indictment caused.179 This criticism paved the way 
to the DOJ’s adoption of DPAs and NPAs as primary prosecutorial tools.180 
This proposal, however, realizes and fully accepts that full prosecution of en-
tire corporations, in light of the concerns over the Arthur Andersen prosecu-
tion, is ill advised.181 For this reason, this proposal focuses on prosecution of 
the individuals rather than corporate entities as a whole.182 Although full 
prosecution of individuals within corporations who are responsible for the 
corporate criminal activity may conceivably have some collateral conse-
quences for some innocent third parties, it is much less likely than with pros-
ecutions of corporate entities.183  
Accordingly, DPAs and NPAs need to be eliminated because they have 
not been utilized solely in an effort to avoid collateral consequences—instead, 
they have become the DOJ’s primary prosecutorial tool in place of full prose-
                                                                                                                           
 176 Id. 
 177 See U.S. ATTORNEY’S MANUAL § 9-27.600(B)(2) (explaining that because a plea agree-
ment is “clearly preferable to permitting an offender to avoid any liability for his/her conduct, the 
possible use of an alternative to a non-prosecution agreement should be given serious considera-
tion in the first instance”); supra notes 103–110 and accompanying text (discussing the expressive 
and deterrent functions of criminal prosecutions, including those that end in a plea agreement, that 
are lacking form NPAs and DPAs). 
 178 See Uhlmann, supra note 13, at 1310–11 (discussing the negative consequences of the 
Arthur Andersen prosecution); Eichenwald, supra note 45 (same); supra notes 45–50 and accom-
panying text (explaining that, following the DOJ’s indictment for committing extensive account-
ing fraud, the major accounting firm Arthur Andersen quickly collapsed due to relentless public 
scrutiny and a rapid loss of clients). 
 179 Uhlmann, supra note 13, at 1310; Johnson, supra note 48. 
 180 See Thompson Memo, supra note 50, at 6 (adopting NPAs and DPAs as part of official 
DOJ policy); supra notes 50–60 and accompanying text (detailing the rise in the DOJ’s use of 
NPAs and DPAs). 
 181 See Uhlmann, supra note 8, at 1310–11 (highlighting the negative collateral consequences 
that occurred after the DOJ prosecuted Arthur Anderson); Johnson, supra note 48 (same). 
 182 See Uhlmann, supra note 8, at 1310–11 (explaining that prosecutions of entire corporate 
entities can cause dramatic collateral consequences to innocent third parties). 
 183 See Glater, supra note 49 (discussing the Arthur Anderson collapse as an example of the 
collateral consequences that can result from prosecutions of entire corporations). 
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cutions of corporations and individuals.184 Even after issuance of the Yates 
Memo, the DOJ still chose to use a DPA to resolve the General Motors faulty 
ignition switch cover up.185 The implementation of this agreement allowed 
every culpable General Motors employee to escape accountability.186 They 
were simply forced to pay a fine, reassuring every corporate executive in the 
United States that engaging in criminal conduct is worth it if you continue to 
make money.187 Allowing culpable individuals to avoid accountability 
through payments from the corporate coffers serves no theory of collateral 
consequence avoidance.188 Indeed, the only innocent third party now forced 
to face collateral consequences is the American public who continually tries 
to recover from the effects of unpunished corporate criminal activity.189 
B. Amend the USAM 
Nevertheless, full eradication of DPAs and NPAs may not be entirely 
feasible.190 With that in mind, the DOJ should, at the very least, amend the 
USAM to specifically address DPAs and NPAs, and make it clear when they 
may be considered, and for which categories of criminal conduct they may be 
used.191 
                                                                                                                           
 184 See Garrett & Ashley, supra note 44 (detailing the DOJ’s increased usage of DPAs and 
NPAs). From 1992 through 2000, the DOJ only entered into thirteen DPAs and NPAs. Id. In 2001 
and 2002, prior to the Thompson Memo, the DOJ entered into eight DPAs and NPAs. Id. Then, in 
2003 and 2004, post-Thompson Memo, the DOJ greatly expanded the use of these agreements by 
utilizing them fifteen different times. Id. Then, from 2008 through 2012, the DOJ averaged more 
than thirty DPAs and NPAs in corporate cases every year, with peaks of thirty-eight in 2010 and 
thirty-seven in 2012. Id. This shift was most pronounced in the DOJ’s Criminal Division, where 
agreements such as these became more frequent than actual criminal prosecutions. Id. From 2010 
through 2012, the Criminal Division alone entered into forty-six DPAs and NPAs, a figure more 
than double the twenty-two plea agreements entered into during the same time frame. U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 106, at 14–15 (2009). 
 185 See RIGGED JUSTICE, supra note 123, at 3 (noting the DOJ’s failure to prosecute any indi-
vidual General Motors employees as an example of the DOJ’s failure to effectively prosecute 
corporate crime); Critics Rip GM Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 123 (same); supra 
notes 157–160 (explaining the DOJ’s failure to prosecute any individual General Motors employ-
ees). 
 186 Critics Rip GM Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 123; Henning, supra note 96. 
 187 Henning, supra note 96. 
 188 See Reilly, supra note 73, at 344–45 (explaining that monetary fines and corporate self-
monitoring, in the absence of criminal sanctions, do not work to deter corporate actors from future 
criminal misconduct); Martin, supra note 102, at 468 (same). 
 189 See Eisinger, supra note 1 (discussing the DOJ’s failure to prosecute any significant indi-
viduals responsible for the 2008 financial crisis and the consequences this has for the American 
public); Rakoff, supra note 1 (same). 
 190 See Uhlmann, supra note 13, at 1344 (arguing for specific limitations on DPAs and NPAs 
rather than total elimination). 
 191 Id. 
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First and foremost, the DOJ should amend the USAM to clarify that 
DPAs and NPAs can never be used in place of prosecution of culpable indi-
viduals where the evidence overwhelmingly points to guilt.192 This proposal 
concedes that DPAs and NPAs may have a place when there are truly no cul-
pable individuals involved in corporate criminality, and the DOJ wishes to 
avoid dealing a corporation a deathblow.193 The USAM, however, could still 
be amended to parallel the Yates Memo’s fourth and fifth guidelines, which 
provide that the DOJ will not provide immunity to culpable individuals when 
resolving corporate investigations and that corporate investigations should not 
end without a clear plan to pursue culpable individuals.194 The problem with 
these principles in their current form is that they do not address how culpable 
individuals are treated under DPAs and NPAs.195 The USAM could more ex-
plicitly state that DPAs and NPAs, specifically, can never be used to release 
culpable individuals from liability, and that they should never serve as the 
final piece of an investigation into individual wrongdoing.196 
Further, the DOJ should amend the USAM to make it clear that DPAs 
and NPAs are to be limited to cases involving relatively minor conduct from 
first time offenders and where civil or administrative enforcement is not 
available.197 DPAs and NPAs should never be permitted to allow individuals 
to escape prosecution in egregious cases, such as the HSBC money launder-
ing case or the General Motors faulty ignition switch cover up.198 Steps 
should also be taken to ensure that eligibility for these agreements does not 
depend upon the size or financial resources of the corporation in question.199 
In addition to these guidelines regarding the type of offenses and offend-
ers for which DPAs and NPAs may be used, the DOJ should also require 
more stringent approval standards for DPAs and NPAs.200 DOJ regulations 
                                                                                                                           
 192 See Martin, supra note 125, at 469 (“DPAs may make it financially viable for corporations 
to bear the risk of criminal business practices due to financial gains made from such practices 
without the threat of an indictment.”); see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 
106, at 20 (explaining that the DOJ is unable to demonstrate the effectiveness of DPAs and NPAs 
and thus is unlikely to be able to justify an increase in their usage). 
 193 See Uhlmann, supra note 13, at 1311 (detailing the potential consequences of prosecuting 
a corporate entity); Johnson, supra note 48 (same). 
 194 Yates Memo, supra note 26, at 5–6. 
 195 See id. (detailing principles for prosecuting culpable individuals but failing to mention the 
use of DPAs or NPAs). DPAs and NPAs do not explicitly provide immunity, and investigations 
into corporate wrongdoing are ended with the introduction of a DPA or NPA. Wray & Hur, supra 
note 39, at 1104 (explaining the general provisions of both NPAs and DPAs). 
 196 See Yates Memo, supra note 26, at 5–6 (noting that, because enforcement of corporate 
crime is a “top priority” for the DOJ, individuals must be held accountable for their wrongdoing). 
 197 Uhlmann, supra note 13, at 1344. 
 198 Id. 
 199 Garrett, supra note 73, at 1811. 
 200 See Uhlmann, supra note 13, at 1344 (arguing that DPAs and NPAs should have the same 
strict approval standards as nolo contendere pleas). 
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should require that prosecutors reject DPAs and NPAs unless the Assistant 
Attorney General concludes that the case is so extraordinary that acceptance 
of the plea would serve the public interest.201 This requirement would exceed 
the current NPA approval requirements and the approval requirements for 
providing immunity to culpable individuals outlined in the Yates Memo.202 It 
would thus provide greater curtailment of DPAs and NPAs in cases where 
individuals were responsible for corporate criminality.203 
CONCLUSION 
The DOJ’s overreliance on DPAs and NPAs in their prosecution of cor-
porate crime needs to end if the Department hopes to better hold individuals 
accountable for corporate criminality. Although the Yates Memo took im-
portant steps in the right direction, development of the above guidelines, 
which would more strictly curtail the use of DPAs and NPAs, would ensure a 
principled and consistent approach to the prosecution of corporate criminality. 
This approach would work to effectively deter future corporate criminal ac-
                                                                                                                           
 201 Id. This approval requirement would reflect the current DOJ approval requirements for 
acceptance of nolo contendere pleas. See U.S. ATTORNEY’S MANUAL § 9-27.500 (discussing the 
strict prosecutorial policies on nolo contendere); supra note 90 (defining nolo contendere pleas). 
According to former Attorney General Herbert Brownwell, Jr., 
One of the factors which has tended to breed contempt for federal law enforcement 
in recent times has been the practice of permitting as a matter of course in many 
criminal indictments the plea of nolo contendere. While it may serve a legitimate 
purpose in a few extraordinary situations and where civil litigation is also pending, I 
can see no justification for it as an everyday practice, particularly where it is used to 
avoid certain indirect consequences of pleading guilty . . . . 
United States v. Jones, 119 F. Supp. 288, 289 n.1 (S.D. Cal. 1954). It seems that these concerns 
regarding the use of no contest pleas to avoid the collateral consequences of pleading guilty would 
apply equally or with greater force to the use of DPAs or NPAs. See Uhlmann, supra note 13, at 
1340. 
 202 See U.S. ATTORNEY’S MANUAL § 9-27.600 (providing that a DOJ attorney may enter into 
a NPA in exchange for cooperation if the cooperation “appears to be necessary to the public inter-
est”); Yates Memo, supra note 26. While this current NPA approval standard sounds similar to the 
proposed standard, it is notably lacking the “so extraordinary” language, and only applies to 
NPAs, not DPAs. U.S. ATTORNEY’S MANUAL § 9-27.600. 
 203 See Yates Memo, supra note 26. 
Because of the importance of holding responsible individuals to account, absent ex-
traordinary circumstances or approved departmental policy such as the Antitrust Di-
vision’s Corporate Leniency Policy, Department lawyers should not agree to a cor-
porate resolution that includes an agreement to dismiss charges against, or provide 
immunity for, individual officers or employees . . . . If a decision is made at the con-
clusion of the investigation not to bring civil claims or criminal charges against the 
individuals who committed the misconduct, the reasons for that determination must 
be memorialized and approved by the United States Attorney or Assistant Attorney 
General whose office handled the investigation, or their designees. 
Id. at 5–6. 
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tivity, uphold the rule of law, and restore confidence in the DOJ’s ability to 
prosecute corporate criminal misconduct. 
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